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Abstract — Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently 
been shown vulnerable to adversarial attacks in which the 
input examples are perturbed to fool these DNNs towards 
confidence reduction and (targeted or random) 
misclassification. In this paper, we demonstrate that how an 
efficient quantization technique can be leveraged to increase 
the robustness of a given DNN against adversarial attacks. We 
present two quantization-based defense mechanisms, namely 
Constant Quantization (CQ) and Variable Quantization 
(VQ), applied at the input to increase the robustness of DNNs. 
In CQ, the intensity of the input pixel is quantized according 
to the number of quantization levels. While in VQ, the 
quantization levels are recursively updated during the 
training phase, thereby providing a stronger defense 
mechanism. We apply our techniques on the Convolutional 
Neural Networks (CNNs, a particular type of DNN which is 
heavily used in vision-based applications) against adversarial 
attacks from the open-source Cleverhans library. Our 
experimental results show 1%-5% increase in the adversarial 
accuracy for MNIST and 0%-2.4% increase in the 
adversarial accuracy for CIFAR10. 
Keywords— Machine Learning, DNN, Quantization, 
Variable Quantization, Security, Adversarial Machine 
Learning, Defense.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, machine learning, especially, deep 
neural networks (DNNs)-based computing paradigms have been 
emerged as prime solution for handling the enormous amount of 
data in many applications, i.e., autonomous vehicles, healthcare, 
transportation management, etc. [1]. Though, DNNs demonstrate 
the tremendous success in addressing several computing 
challenges, but these algorithms are vulnerable to several security 
threats [18]. The reason behind these security vulnerabilities in 
DNNs is their dependencies on input datasets, e.g., training of 
these models is heavily dependent on the training dataset. This 
data dependency can be exploited to perform several security 
attacks, i.e., data poisoning during ML training or inference. 
However, data poisoning during the training process requires 
complete access to data, training process and baseline ML 
algorithm. Moreover, these data poisoning attacks have a direct 
impact on a trained ML algorithm which can be exploited to 
neutralize these attacks.  
On the other hand, data poisoning attacks during the inference, 
usually do not change the trained ML algorithm but it exploits 
their data dependencies to perform security attacks, i.e., 
misclassification and confidence reduction.  However, the key 
challenge in manipulating the inference data is imperceptibility 
of added noise. For example, adversarial examples generate the 
imperceptible adversarial noise to fool the DNN inferencing [3]. 
Therefore, there is a dire need of developing the defense 
mechanisms to protect the DNN inference.  
Several defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks have 
been proposed, i.e., adversarial training [10][13][12] and DNN 
masking [14][15]. Though, these defense mechanisms either 
change the DNN structure or train it against the known 
adversarial vulnerabilities, which limits their defense scope to 
known vulnerabilities. Moreover, several counter-attacks have 
proposed to neutralize these defense mechanisms [6][16][17]. 
Therefore, more flexible and comprehensive defense strategy 
is required that can reduce the imperceptibility to make it 
detectable.   
A. Motivational Analysis 
As an alternative solution, quantization has emerged as one of 
the prime solutions to reduce the imperceptibility of adversarial 
examples [12][15] because of their inherent property of being 
insensitive to small perturbations. To show this behavior, we 
perform an experiment on one of the commonly used CNN 
structure and adversarial attacks from the open-source 
Cleverhans [19] library by providing it the quantized clear and 
perturbed images. Fig. 1 shows that just by introducing the 
quantization in an attack image its adversarial accuracy 
significantly increased to (24.66% from 8.87%). It can also be 
observed that the quantized adversarial images are almost 
identical to the quantized clean images. 
 
Fig. 1: Comparison of the quantized output for clean and 
adversarial (Adv.) images of CIFAR10 
B. Associated Research Challenges 
Though quantization is insensitive to small perturbations, to 
reduce the imperceptibility following research challenges should 
be addressed:  
1. How to explore the quantization effects on the gradient to 
develop the defense strategies? 
2. How to explore the quantization to reduce the 
imperceptibility of the adversarial examples? 
3. How to address the flexibility problem with respect to 
quantization levels in both variable and constant 
quantization techniques? 
C. Novel Contribution 
To address the above-mentioned research challenges, we propose 
to leverage constant and variable quantization to develop the 
defense against adversarial attacks. In summary, in this paper, 
we make the following contributions:   
1) QuSecNets (Section III): We propose to leverage insensitive 
nature of quantization towards small perturbations by 
introducing an additional trainable quantization layer at the 
input of a DNN.  
2) Trainable Quantization (Section III.A): We propose to 
exploit the tunable thresholds in variable quantization to train 
the quantization layer against several types of adversarial 
attacks. 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL 
ATTACKS 
In this section, we provide the brief explanation of the adversarial 
examples and the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms. Table 1 
provides a comprehensive view of different related works in a 
categorized fashion highlighting their key features, threat models, 
and limitations. In the following, we discuss the most relevant 
works in more detail. 
Table 1: Summary of the Existing Defense Strategies for Machine Learning Networks 
Techniques Approaches 
Related 
Work 
Threat 
Model 
Description Motivation 
Tunable 
Defense 
Parameters 
Limitations 
Feature 
Squeezing 
Input Transformation [12] 
White-box Reduces the number of bits in order to 
make the inputs insensitive to small 
perturbations 
Improved Accuracy No JSMA, CW 
Black-box 
BReLU + 
GDA 
Input Transformation 
[14] 
White-box Instead of ReLU, introduces and uses 
Bounded ReLU activation and Augments 
the input data with the Gaussian Noise 
during training 
Improved Accuracy No JSMA, CW 
Adversarial Learning Black-box 
APE-GAN 
Input Transformation 
[13] 
White-box Introduces a GAN as the input to the CNN. 
GAN is trained to generate clean images 
out of both clean and Adversarial images 
GAN based defense Yes 
Attacks on 
GAN Adversarial Learning Black-box 
Defense-GAN Input Transformation [20] 
White-box Uses a trained GAN with random inputs to 
generate an image and minimizes the mean 
square error of input and generated image 
GAN based defense Yes 
Attacks on 
GAN Black-box 
Adversarial 
Training 
Adversarial Learning [10] 
White-box Trains the DNN on adversarial examples 
crafted out of Training dataset 
Robustness is 
embedded within the 
DNN 
No 
Unknown 
Attacks Black-box 
Defensive 
Distillation 
Gradient Masking [11] White-box 
Trains the DNN based on the outputs of an 
already trained DNN 
Robustness is 
embedded with the 
DNN No 
Transfer 
Attacks 
Smooth Label training 
Dynamic 
Quantization 
Activation 
Gradient Masking 
[15] 
White-box 
Train the DNN with a Dynamic 
Quantization Layer at the input of the 
Conventional DNN and introduces a 
tunable threshold 
Quantization with 
tunable Thresholds 
Yes 
Transfer 
Attacks 
Input Transformation Black-box 
Black-box 
Attacks 
JSMA, CW 
QuSecNets 
Input Transformation 
This paper 
White-box 
Trains the DNN with a differentiable 
variable threshold Quantization Layer and 
constant threshold quantization Layer 
Differentiable 
Quantization with 
tunable thresholds 
Yes JSMA, CW 
Adversarial Learning Black-box 
Integer number of 
quantization levels 
Increased 
Perceptibility of 
Adversarial Examples 
 
A. Adversarial Examples 
Adversarial examples are usually small and invisible perturbation 
in the input from adversary to manipulate the ML-based 
classification to perform the targeted or un-targeted attacks on a 
DNN. The imperceptibility and strength of these attacks are 
highly dependent on their optimization function. Therefore, 
based upon the attack strategies, these approaches can be 
categorized as follows [1]. 
Gradient-Based Attacks: These attacks generate the adversarial 
noise based on the gradient of the loss function with respect to 
the corresponding parts of the input images/samples. Some of the 
most commonly used gradient-based attacks are Fast Gradient 
Sign Method (FGSM) [3], Jacobian Saliency Map Attack 
(JSMA) [4], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [5], Carlini-Wagner 
Attacks (CW) [6] and DeepFool [7]. 
Decision Based Attacks: Unlike Gradient-based attacks, 
Decision Based attacks do not require the calculation or 
estimation of gradients of loss. Instead, they utilize the class 
decision of the model in order to introduce the perturbation in the 
input image. Examples include Point-wise Attack [8] and 
Additive Gaussian Noise Attack [8]. 
Score Based Attacks: These attacks analyze the statistical or 
probabilistic behavior of the individual input components to 
estimate the corresponding gradients with respect to loss 
function. Some of the common used attacks are Single-Pixel 
Attack [9] and Local Search Attack [9]. 
B. Defense Mechanisms 
Adversarial attacks are one of the major security vulnerabilities 
in ML-based applications. Therefore, to improve and ensure the 
security of ML-based applications several defense strategies have 
been proposed based on the DNN masking [12], gradient 
masking [11], training for known adversarial attacks [10][13] and 
quantization of input of the DNNs [12][15].  
One of the most commonly used approach is to train the 
DNNs for the adversarial attacks. For example, adversarial 
learning trains the DNN based on the known adversarial 
examples but it limits its scope to known adversarial attack. 
Based on the similar concept, Adversarial Perturbation 
Elimination using GANs (APE-GAN) has been proposed. This 
technique considers each input sample as a potential adversarial 
example and retrains the network to remove the imperceptible 
noises. However, by introducing relatively stronger adversarial 
noise than the one at which APE-GAN is trained, one can break 
this defense mechanism.  
Another approach is to either mask the gradient or the whole 
DNN, e.g., Defensive Distillation masks the gradient of the 
network, but it is only valid for gradient-based attacks and it can be 
compromised by empirically inferring the gradient by applying 
different loss functions [16]. To address this issue, several 
techniques have been proposed to mask the entire DNN to limit the 
leakage of empirical information. The activation function can also 
be exploited to avoid small perturbations, i.e., Bounded Relu and 
Gaussian Data Augmentation (BReLU+GDA) [14]. 
As an alternative solution, quantization has emerged as one 
of the prime defense mechanisms against adversarial examples. 
For example, feature squeezing technique uses the binary 
quantization [12]. Similarly, the dynamic quantization techniques 
have been explored to neutralize the impact of adversarial 
example [15]. However, due to less flexibility in quantization 
levels for both constant and variable quantization, these 
techniques are limited to known attacks. Therefore, in this 
paper, we leverage integral quantization level and flexibility 
variable quantization to develop a flexible and trainable 
defense mechanism.  
III. QUANTIZATION-BASED DEFENSE FOR DNN  
In this section, we discuss the proposed methodology, 
QuSecNets, which exploits the quantization to develop a defense 
mechanism against the adversarial attack in DNNs. The proposed 
methodology consists of the following steps, as shown in Fig. 2: 
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Fig. 2: Proposed Methodology to design quantization-aware secure 
DNNs 
1. First, we select a DNN model and the quantization methods 
based on the targeted vulnerabilities, input dataset and 
applications. 
2. Afterwards, we design and integrate the quantization layer 
within the selected DNN model. This quantization layer has 
one-to-one relation with the input layer, i.e., for each input 
pixel there is one quantization function. This function is 
defined as the average value of “n” sigmoid function 
“       ” (See Fig. 2) and can be formulated as: 
            
 
   
  
 
           
 
   
 (1) 
Where  , 𝑧 and    is the intensity of a single pixel from input 
image, the scalar constant and the threshold values which may (in 
variable quantization) or may not (in constant quantization) be 
trained, respectively. Moreover, the   represents the number of 
quantization levels, e.g., if the number of quantization levels is 2, 
all the values below 0.5 are set to 0, while those above or equal 
to the 0.5 are set to 1 
3. After integrating it with the DNN, we train the modified 
network, depending upon the quantization methodology. For 
example, in case of constant quantization, we do not train the 
quantization layer. However, in case of variable quantization 
we propose to utilize the backpropagation methodology.  
A. Training the Quantization Layer 
In case of variable quantization, we need to train the thresholds 
(  ) based on the output prediction/classification probabilities of 
the DNNs. Therefore, first we define a cost function to identify 
the difference between the actual and targeted predictions.  
𝑐𝑜𝑠   
 
𝐶
   𝑃   𝑐   𝑃   𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐  
 
𝐶
 𝑐  
 (2) 
Where, 𝑃   𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐  and 𝑃   𝑐  represent the probability of 
input   to be classified as any class 𝑐  and actual class 𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 
respectively. Similar to the back-propagation algorithm in DNN 
training, the threshold of the quantization layer can be trained by 
minimizing the cost function (Equation (3)): 
   𝑒𝑤     𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝜂 
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 (3) 
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 ∆  (6) 
Where,    is the output of the sigmoid function and "𝛿 " denotes 
the sensitivity of   for all the variables in the first convolutional 
layer of the DNN defined by the backpropagation. Thus, the 
change in cost function is determined by the following equation.  
𝜕  𝑐𝑜𝑠  
𝜕    𝑜𝑙𝑑
  (  ∆ 
𝑎𝑙𝑙   𝑖  𝑦
) (  (
  
   
)  𝑧           
𝑎𝑙𝑙   𝑖  𝑦
) (7) 
By combining the Equations 3 and 7, the training equation for 
quantization threshold modeled as: 
   𝑒𝑤     𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝜂   (  ∆ 
𝑎𝑙𝑙   𝑖  𝑦
) (  (
  
   
)  𝑧           
  𝑖  𝑦
) (8) 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To illustrate the effectiveness of our QuSecNets, we integrate the 
quantization layer with one of the commonly used baseline CNN 
structure from the open-source Cleverhans library which also has 
several online adversarial attacks. We perform several analyses 
using the experimental setup shown in Fig. 4. 
• CNN: we use the following CNN structure from the 
Cleverhans libarary: Conv2D(64, 8x8) - Conv2D(128, 6x6) - 
Conv2D(128, 5x5) - Dense(10) - Softmax(). 
• Dataset: we trained and tested the above mention CNN 
structure for the CIFAR10 and the MNIST datasets with 
experimental parameters given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Experimental parameters for CNN training and testing 
Parameters Value 
No. of epochs 6 -10 
Number of Images in Test Dataset 10000 
Batch Size 128 
Learning Rate 0.001 
• Adversarial Attack: we implemented some of the state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM, JSMA, and CW-L2.  
• Threat Model: We assume both White-box and Black-box 
threat models. In both models, the adversary can only alter the 
inputs, however, in white box scenario the adversary knows 
and uses the weights and biases of our QuSecNet. 
 
Fig. 3: Attacking the QuSecNet assuming a) Black-box Threat 
Model and b) White-box Threat Model. 
A. Experimental Analysis 
This section provides the detailed analysis of the QuSecNets 
against the implemented adversarial attacks. 
Impact of Variable Quantization on Adversarial Training: It 
can be observed that Variable Quantization Layer, though quite 
ineffective as a solo defense highly assists adversarial training of 
a network (see Fig. 5). Authors of  [15] also made this observation 
but their evaluation seems to have a major flaw. The impact of 
Dynamic Quantization Activation (DQA) on Adversarial 
Training, using gradient-based attacks, gives delusional results as 
the “signum” function masks the gradient and the adversary is 
unable to generate adversarial examples (see Fig. 6). Considering 
this fact, the positive impact of DQA on Adversarial Training 
becomes unclear. 
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Fig. 4: Experimental analysis of QuSecNets against multiple attacks 
from Cleverhans for MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. 
Effect of “z” - the Scalar Constant: In this experimental 
analysis, the value of scalar constant “z” is set to be 5 for Variable 
Quantization Layer. This parameter is directly proportional to the 
quantization effect However, for higher values it reduces 
derivative slope of quantized output and makes it a constant 
function which halts the training process. This effect is shown in 
Equation (9). 
   𝑒𝑤     𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝜂  
𝑑
𝑑  
𝑐𝑜𝑠  
𝑧         
   
 (9) 
85
90
95
100
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
A
d
v
er
sa
ri
a
l 
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Epsilon
Simple Variable Quantization
 
Fig. 5: Accuracy on adversarial examples generated by FGSM for 
Adversarial Training of simple CNN vs. Adversarial Training of 
Variable QuSecNet for MNIST 
 
Fig. 6: Comparison of Adversarial Examples generated for 
QuSecNets and DQA [14] with clean image. 
Through experimental analysis, we observed that value of “z” 
should be set between 5 and 40 to train the variable quantization 
layer effectively. However, for the constant quantization, a higher 
value (we use z = 50) is required to achieve better quantization 
effects. 
Effect of changing the number of Quantization Levels in 
Quantization Layers:  
Increasing the 
quantization levels tends 
to decrease the output 
accuracy as shown in the 
Fig. 7. This is justifiable 
as increasing the 
quantization levels 
effectively makes the 
quantized input image 
more similar to the 
actual non-quantized input image. In addition, an increase in 
quantization levels also increases the number of transitions in the 
Quantization layer. This makes the input more sensitive to the 
adversarial noise. 
Increased Perceptibility of Adversarial Examples: Constant 
Quantization and Variable Quantization tend to reduce the 
imperceptibility of the Adversarial Examples (See Fig. 8). This is 
due to reduced insensitivity of the QuSecNet to small changes in 
the inputs.  
We observe that the quantization showed better results in terms 
of Adversarial Accuracy for MNIST as compared to CIFAR10 
(See Fig. 9 to Fig. 11 ). We believe that this is due to the clustered 
distribution of MNIST.  
 
Fig. 8: Adversarial examples generated to fool QuSecNets for 
various defense strategies. Clean images are given for comparison. 
V. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENSE 
MECHANISMS 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense 
mechanism, in this section, we present a comparison with state-
of-the-art defense mechanisms, i.e, Feature Squeezing and 
BRELU+GDA.  
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Fig. 9: Comparison of the proposed strategies with the state-of-the-
art defenses for FGSM attacks. Epsilon = 0.3 for MNIST and 
Epsilon = 0.1 for CIFAR10 
Fig. 9 reports our results for the FGSM attacks against different 
Defense mechanisms on MNIST and CIFAR10. The adversarial 
accuracy captures the accuracy of the DNNs on adversarial 
examples. Clean accuracies for the MNIST are observed to be 
reduced by a very small amount for Constant and Variable 
Quantization. The constant quantization works most effectively 
for the white-box FGSM attacks (from 1.48% to 97.51%. BReLU 
[14] reports an accuracy of 94% for such attacks) due to the 
insensitivity of the Quantization Layer to small perturbations in 
inputs. However, these results are not as appealing for CIFAR10 
white box FGSM attacks. We believe this is because of the 
clustered distribution of the MNIST dataset, which increases the 
effectiveness of the Quantization Layer. We observe that integral 
constant quantization almost always outperforms every other 
defense strategy including the state-of-the-art defenses (Feature 
Squeezing [12] and BReLU [14]). Variable Quantization 
surpasses the Constant Quantization if the Adversarial Training 
is performed for the DNN (See Fig. 5 and Fig. 9). Our white-box 
results against FGSM attacks for CIFAR10 are inferior to 
BReLU. However, for the black-box attacks our defenses 
compete and often surpass the BReLU in effectiveness. 
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Fig. 7: Adversarial Accuracy of 
Constant QuSecNets against FGSM 
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Fig. 10: Comparison of the proposed strategies for CW-L2 attacks. 
No. of source samples for targeted CW-L2 attacks = 10, No. of 
iterations = 100. 
Results for targeted and untargeted CW-L2 attacks for different 
defense strategies are reported in Fig. 10 for comparison. 
QuSecNets cause significant improvement in the robustness of 
DNNs for both MNIST (88% for white-box and 90% for Black-
box) and CIFAR (54% for White-box and 50% for CIFAR) as 
compared to CNNs with no defense mechanism (0%). We do not 
report the results for Feature Squeezing and BReLU here, 
because of different DNN Models used for evaluation of results. 
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Fig. 11: Comparison of the proposed for Targeted JSMA attacks. 
No. of source samples = 10, No. of iterations = 100. 
Fig. 11 reports the results of QuSecNets against targeted JSMA 
attacks. The reason for the inferior results is that JSMA 
introduces concentrated noise at few pixels in the input image 
instead of small distributed perturbation, which the Quantization 
Layer effectively counters. The accuracy for concentrated attacks 
can be significantly improved by other strategies such as median 
filters [12] or input drop-out. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose to leverage the insensitive and dynamic 
nature of constant/variable quantization towards small 
perturbation for developing a defense mechanism, QuSecNets. 
This methodology introduces an additional layer at the input of 
DNNs, to reduce the imperceptibility. To demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the proposed methodology, we evaluate our 
approach against some of the state-of-the-art attacks, i.e., FGSM, 
CW, JSMA and compare it with the state-of-the-art. We 
empirically prove that Integral Constant Quantization Layer 
significantly hardens the DNNs. In addition, we show that 
QuSecNets have a better Adversarial Learning capability as 
compared to the conventional DNNs for clustered datasets. 
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